Canada’s declining fertility rate: Q&A with expert Bruce Newbold

“Canada’s fertility rate, which has been declining for decades, hit a record low in 2024. This downward trend could lead to economic stagnation, increased health care costs, and social isolation, a McMaster expert warns. Fertility rates are declining globally, with the lowest rates concentrated in east Asian and European countries. In Canada, the total fertility rate (TFR) in 2024 was 1.25 children per woman — well below the replacement level of 2.1, which is the level required to replace one generation with the next. Low fertility has led to a shift in our country’s age structure: a larger share of adults over 65 and a smaller share of children under 15. People are also living longer. This, combined with low fertility, has naturally led to population aging. In 1990, the median age in Canada was 32, and by 2010 it was nearly 39. Today, the median age is about 40.6 years, and it will continue to rise. Bruce Newbold is a professor in the School of Earth, Environment and Society, and Acting Dean of the Faculty of Science. His research interests focus on population issues as they relate to immigration, migration, health and aging. We asked Newbold about Canada’s fertility rate: What’s driving its decline, how we compare to other countries, the long-term implications, and whether we can change it. What’s driving Canada’s declining fertility rate? With the exception of the post-war baby boom, Canada’s fertility level has been declining for decades. There are two critical reasons why this is happening. The first is shifting priorities, including placing greater value on careers, leisure and personal fulfillment over marriage and larger families. The second is constraints, including the high cost of raising children, access to daycare, the conflict between work and family, unequal gender roles, economic uncertainty, and delayed marriage. How does Canada’s fertility rate compare to that of other countries? Canada is in the middle of the pack in terms of fertility decline. Some countries, including many European countries and Japan, started the decline much earlier than Canada did. That means that our fertility rates haven’t dipped as low as some countries and that we have a smaller share of older adults (aged 65+) in comparison to some others. Canada has also relied much more on immigration as a way of blunting the impact of fertility declines. Immigrants tend to be younger adults and have bolstered the labour force. In the end, however, everyone ages, and the fertility of immigrants to Canada tends to be very similar to the overall fertility level. You are hard pressed to find countries with a growing fertility rate. What we do see are countries with higher fertility rates than Canada. Countries with higher fertility rates – and especially those with fertility rates greater than that needed for replacement – tend to be less economically developed as compared to Canada. But this is quickly changing, and we are seeing declining fertility rates around the globe given near-universal preferences for smaller families, cost issues, and greater engagement in the labour market by women. What are the long-term economic and social implications of a declining fertility rate in Canada? Low fertility has some pretty significant implications. Economically, low fertility is associated with a shrinking and aging labour force, which could include skill shortages. In addition, older adults typically need greater health-care resources, along with assisted living or home care costs, leading to cost increases for health care and social programs. Shifting consumer preferences, spending and voting preferences will also be felt. Older adults, for example, will have different spending patterns than younger adults or their children, with greater emphasis on leisure activities and health care, and less on housing and child-related expenses. Aging could be felt at election time, given older adults are more likely to vote and will vote for the programs or platforms they value. Population aging also goes hand in hand with low fertility. From a national perspective, our aging population will likely mean slower GDP growth as the labour force shrinks. Business and industry will need to adapt to ensure productivity improvements through technology adoption and to offset labour shortages. Socially, there is the risk of greater isolation, increased stress on families to provide care, increased demand for long-term care and home care, greater needs for health care and social services that are directed to older adults, and housing impacts as older adults typically prefer to age in place. What is Canada’s ideal fertility rate and what strategies can the government implement to get us there? There isn’t a clear consensus on what an ideal fertility rate is. Some would argue that it would be the replacement level, which would mean that our population doesn’t change on its own. Any population changes that do occur would instead be driven by movement into or out of the country. However, it would be next to impossible to sustain a replacement fertility level. As Pierre Trudeau once said (and I paraphrase), “The government has no business in the bedrooms of the nation.” He wasn’t referring to fertility choices, but put simply, the government can’t really influence fertility rates. Various governments have tried to increase fertility levels by offering fertility assistance, tax incentives, cash bonuses for larger families, and the like, but these have only ever led to a short-term shift in fertility at best. More than likely, these incentives prompted those that wanted larger families to have children, but they haven’t had a long-term impact. Greater gender equality in terms of work-life balance and childcare may help. The other piece is that any move to increase fertility can’t be done by just one action. The government’s national childcare strategy, for instance, is meant to reduce the costs of childcare for families. But on its own, it won’t be sufficient to shift fertility choices. Childcare plus strong maternity leave programs together are still insufficient to shift the needle. There is still an abundance of other costs that must be incurred, such as food, clothing, education, and the expected gender roles around childcare at home remain well entrenched. Economic uncertainty plays into fertility choices — people are less likely to have children when the economy is poor or when they face their own economic uncertainty as they are unable or unwilling to absorb additional costs associated with children. By way of example, there was an expectation that fertility would increase in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic. Everyone was at home, creating opportunities to start a family, but it didn’t happen. People were uncertain about what would happen next and whether they would have a job. Decisions to start a family or have another child were put off. Sustained, long-term attention is needed to shift fertility choices. Most importantly, there is the need for a shift in childcare assumptions in the home environment. Countries with higher gender equality — where caregiving and paid work are more equally shared — tend to have higher fertility, but not necessarily above replacement fertility. In contrast, countries with lower gender equality, such as South Korea and Japan, tend to have lower fertility rates. Shifting these expectations is difficult and cannot be done quickly. The post Canada’s declining fertility rate: Q&A with expert Bruce Newbold appeared first on McMaster News .

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