Climate change is worsening violent extremism in Kenya – what can be done

“Climate change and its associated impacts can worsen security challenges, including those associated with violent extremism. This is particularly the case in areas that are both vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and characterised by social and political instability. In north-eastern Kenya, for instance, droughts, flooding and livelihood destruction are unfolding alongside, and worsening, activity by al-Shabaab , a terrorist network headquartered in Somalia. The terror group has evolved from carrying out large-scale attacks in Kenya, such as the Westgate Mall attack (in 2013) and the Garissa University attack (2015) , to persistent, low-intensity attacks and broader community engagement in the border region. Despite these overlapping crises, the understanding of how climate change and violent extremism interact remains limited. As a multidisciplinary team, we set out to address this gap through workshops with policymakers and practitioners working across relevant policy areas in Nairobi and north-eastern Kenya, as well as focus groups and interviews with community members and leaders in the region. Our findings highlight how in vulnerable environments, climate change acts as a threat multiplier . It intensifies: economic instability, by damaging and destroying livelihoods social fragmentation, by increasing the strain on social networks psychological strain, through the scale of destruction caused by cumulative climate events institutional weaknesses, by increasing pressure on public services and government access. These conditions provide increased opportunities for extremists to influence or coerce the local population. When we spoke with local herders and community leaders in north-eastern Kenya, we found that the impact of climate change left local communities more vulnerable to recruitment by extremists. At the same time, al-Shabaab activities in the area made it harder for communities to adapt to a changing environment. This reinforces a cycle of fragility. Climate impacts and insecurity are interwoven dynamics that shape everyday life, governance and prospects for stability in north-eastern Kenya. Our findings challenge the idea that climate change and security can be addressed separately. Effective responses must combine environmental, social and security strategies to build long-term resilience. Livelihood destruction For pastoralists in the north-eastern Kenyan counties of Garissa and Wajir, keeping livestock is not just a job. It is their identity, their food security and their children’s future. However, as droughts and flash floods become more frequent , herds are being decimated. In times of desperation, al-Shabaab positions itself as a provider. As one community member told us: When the land dries up, animals die, farms fail, and people go hungry, especially the youth, they become desperate. Al-Shabaab knows this and exploits it. They offer food, money, and what seems like ‘purpose’ to young boys who feel abandoned by their own government. What we had not anticipated before undertaking this research was the profound emotional toll of climate change and how this is creating ideal conditions for al-Shabaab recruitment. The loss of livestock causes a deep sense of shame among men who can no longer fulfil their role as providers. A local herder told us: We are men, supposed to provide, but we found ourselves helpless. In a culture where “a man without animals is seen as a child, no matter his age”, as one respondent put it, this loss of status leads to depression and hopelessness. Extremist groups exploit this emotional emptiness. They offer a sense of status to men who feel they have lost everything else. Increased migration As water and pasture vanish, herders are forced to travel much further from home, often entering remote, insecure areas where the state has limited presence. This increased mobility is a necessary survival strategy. But it increases the likelihood of encountering al-Shabaab. Individuals arriving in new areas with depleted resources and no social contacts are vulnerable to recruitment. In these remote areas, al-Shabaab often steps in to provide assistance, such as protection. The lack of veterinary services and schooling creates several further vulnerabilities. When children drop out of school to follow herds, they become soft targets for recruiters. Social breakdown Beyond individual loss, violent extremism is unravelling social bonds. In the past, neighbours could count on each other. Now, they are drifting apart because nobody has anything left to give, leading to a profound loss of community dignity. As one community member put it: When your neighbour comes asking for milk or sugar, you have nothing to offer. Our economy is not just about money; it is about sharing. When livestock die, that sharing disappears, and we become poorer not only in wealth but also in spirit. Even the authority of community elders is under pressure. They are losing influence because their traditional wisdom about the seasons is no longer effective. Their status diminishes, creating a leadership vacuum. Al-Shabaab is quick to attempt to fill this void, offering a new sense of order. Governance challenges The reach of the Kenyan state is limited in the remote and arid northern region. When aid is delayed or distributed unevenly, it fuels grievances about neglect. Al-Shabaab is highly effective at using religious and political language to channel these frustrations against the state. It presents its own ideology as a path to justice. Furthermore, insecurity prevents the delivery of the services needed for climate adaptation, leaving the most vulnerable populations dependent on anyone who will help. This gives al-Shabaab a clear entry point. The way forward Breaking this cycle of vulnerability requires a policy shift that integrates environmental and security strategies. It is necessary to formally recognise climate change as a critical security issue, to trigger the multi-agency coordination necessary for mitigation. In practice, this means aligning national and county-level plans to prevent and counter violent extremism with climate adaptation strategies. This would enable agencies to share knowledge and pool funding. Climate adaptation plans must incorporate conflict analyses to ensure aid does not inadvertently fuel grievances. Most importantly, future interventions must look beyond technical solutions to address the emotional weight of lost dignity and the breakdown of social structures. This will foster resilience in the local economy and the community. Dylan O'Driscoll receives funding from the British Academy for this research. He is an Associate Senior Fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen receives funding from the British Academy. Joel Busher received funding from the British Academy for this research. Wilson Ndenyele receives funding from the British Academy. Sheila Ronoh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

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