Iran will no longer accept endless talks. It is creating deterrence on its own terms

“Iran will no longer accept endless talks. It is creating deterrence on its own terms Submitted by Seyed Hossein Mousavian on Mon, 06/08/2026 - 16:38 Weekend strikes highlight Tehran's shifting strategic calculus - and a refusal to remain bound by one-sided agreements Iranian pro-government demonstrators wave the flags of Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah movement, in Tehran on 7 June 2026 (Atta Kenare/AFP) On As conflict flared up again this weekend between Israel and Iran , negotiations with the US have failed to produce any agreement. Neither side can afford another war, but the path towards a diplomatic settlement has been stymied by Washington’s demands for far-reaching concessions from Iran, without any offer of commensurate reciprocal measures, such as the release of even a portion of Iran’s frozen assets. After the US and Israeli military strikes on Iran in 2025 and again this year, western discussions largely focused on the physical damage inflicted on Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure, its uranium enrichment capabilities, and its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. In Iran, however, the central question is different: did negotiations and nuclear restraint produce greater security, or did they ultimately create heightened vulnerability? The reality is that the US-Israeli wars on Iran inflicted significant damage on its nuclear and military facilities. But the ongoing conflict has also imposed enormous costs on the US - including more than $1 trillion in expenditures, significant damage to US military assets, global economic disruption, and substantial civilian and military casualties. At the same time, the US-Israeli campaign has achieved few of its stated objectives, namely to eliminate Iran’s missile capabilities, end its nuclear programme, and facilitate political change. What the wars did change, however, was Iran’s strategic calculus, producing four major shifts in this regard. Firstly, we have seen the collapse of a strategy built on restraint and engagement. Despite a broad consensus among observers that Iran had complied with the 2015 nuclear deal , accepting extensive restrictions and unprecedented inspections, the US unilaterally withdrew from the agreement just three years later, and the military attacks followed. As a result, confidence in the idea that diplomacy and nuclear restraint can guarantee security has been severely damaged. For many Iranians, restraint is now increasingly viewed not as protection, but as vulnerability. Central question Secondly, public trust in the US has collapsed. While Iran’s leadership has long been sceptical of Washington, public opinion was often different. After the signing of the nuclear agreement a decade ago, optimism in Iran was widespread, with a Gallup survey at the time finding that 68 percent of Iranians believed their leaders had negotiated a good deal, 66 percent expected economic improvement, and 51 percent anticipated better relations with the US. Today, the debate inside Iran is no longer primarily about centrifuges or enrichment levels. The central question has become: if Iran accepts new restrictions, what guarantees exist that a future US administration will not abandon the agreement, or that another military confrontation will not follow? For many Iranians, the current crisis is less a nuclear dispute than a crisis of trust. Even voices that previously advocated de-escalation now emphasise the need for credible deterrent capabilities Thirdly, we have seen a shift from ideology to nationalism. For decades, confrontation with the US and Israel was framed primarily in ideological terms. The recent conflict appears to have produced a different dynamic: while many Iranians remain opposed to war, sanctions and isolation, public sentiment has increasingly shifted towards a form of everyday nationalism . Rather than strengthening ideological narratives, external military pressure has reinforced broader feelings of national identity and collective solidarity. This trend may become one of the most enduring political consequences of the wars. Finally, perhaps the most important shift concerns deterrence . Even voices that previously advocated de-escalation now emphasise the need for credible deterrent capabilities. This does not necessarily imply support for nuclear weapons; rather, it reflects a growing belief that no political agreement can remain sustainable unless Iran possesses sufficient means to deter future attacks. This shift played out in real-time over the weekend, as Iran launched strikes against Israel over the latter’s continuing assault on Tehran’s ally Lebanon - marking the first time Iran has hit Israel not as retaliation for attacks on its own territory, but as a warning over continuing ceasefire violations in Lebanon. Strategic framework Following the Iran- Iraq War in the 1980s, Iran’s security doctrine rested on three pillars: strengthening indigenous military capabilities (which eventually produced the missile, drone and cyber capabilities displayed in the recent conflict), achieving self-sufficiency in nuclear technology and domestic fuel production, and extending deterrence beyond Iran’s borders through its regional “axis of resistance”. When it comes to shaping Iran’s future security doctrine, the strategic impact of the 2025 and 2026 wars may ultimately exceed even that of Saddam Hussein’s invasion, since the US-Israeli assaults were widely perceived inside Iran as direct threats to national survival and sovereignty. Consequently, a revised strategic framework appears to be emerging around four principles. The first can be summarised as “security for all or security for none”. After the 2025 US-Israeli attacks, Iran’s military response was largely confined to Israel and a single American base in the Gulf. During the 2026 conflict, however, Iran’s strategic calculations expanded to include US military installations across the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and broader global economic interests. From Tehran’s perspective , the lesson is clear: security can no longer be treated as a unilateral privilege. Either there is security for all regional actors, or security for none. Secondly, we have seen the emergence of a new key factor: public opinion. Before the wars, Iran’s strategic debate largely revolved around two concepts: the “battlefield” and “diplomacy”. The recent wars added a third: the street . The wave of nationalism that emerged was reflected in large public gatherings across major cities. While supporting national defence, many participants also conveyed a message to policymakers that excessive trust in negotiations with Washington is no longer acceptable. As a result, Iranian diplomacy today increasingly operates under the influence of both military institutions and public opinion. A broad consensus is emerging inside Iran that security, trust, deterrence and diplomacy are inseparable Thirdly, the emerging consensus emphasises deterrence through a combination of instruments: stronger military capabilities, preservation of nuclear expertise, continued regional partnerships, and incorporation of the Strait of Hormuz into broader security calculations. The result is a more comprehensive understanding of deterrence than the one that existed before the wars. Finally, the loss of Iran’s supreme leader, military commanders, regional partners and hundreds of civilians has created a powerful collective memory that will shape Iranian perceptions for years to come. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was not only the leader of a state; he was also one of the most prominent Shia religious authorities, with millions of followers worldwide. For the first time in modern history, a leading Shia religious authority was killed in military action by foreign states. This is not an event that many Iranians or Shia communities around the world are likely to forget. After the killing of General Qassem Soleimani in 2020, US officials openly expressed concerns over possible Iranian retaliation. Recent conflicts have led not only to the killings of numerous senior Iranian military leaders, but also to the assassinations of key figures within the broader “axis of resistance”, including Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah and Hamas negotiator Ismail Haniyeh . It would be unwise for policymakers and security institutions to dismiss the potential long-term security consequences of these events. Window for diplomacy Meanwhile, despite widespread mistrust, diplomacy remains far from dead. Although some Iranian political figures fear that another military confrontation may be on the horizon, significant support for diplomacy still exists within Iran. What has changed is not the desire for negotiations, but the expectations surrounding any future agreement. If the nuclear deal focused primarily on nuclear restrictions, many in Tehran now argue that any future agreement must contain three key elements. Firstly, nonproliferation within the framework of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty must protect Iran’s right to enrich uranium, while building confidence that Tehran will not pursue nuclear weapons. Is Iran the new regional superpower? Read More » Secondly, meaningful economic benefits must come through substantial sanctions relief . And thirdly, any deal needs to include credible assurances that this military conflict will not be repeated. Despite the deep mistrust generated by recent wars, diplomacy remains the only viable path forward - because neither Iran, nor the US, nor indeed the region as a whole can escape the realities of coexistence. The central challenge is in breaking a decades-long cycle of crisis, sanctions, negotiations, agreements, collapse and renewed conflict, which neither military force nor economic pressure has resolved. The most important consequence of the recent wars is not a shift in Iran’s relative strength, but a transformation in its understanding of security. A broad consensus is emerging inside Iran that security, trust, deterrence and diplomacy are inseparable. Unless Washington and its regional allies recognise this shift, future agreements are likely to remain temporary, while the cycle of confrontation continues. The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye. War on Iran Opinion Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:29 Update Date Override 0

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