No Pseudonymity for Most Challengers of Visa Vetting Policy

“From Doe v. U.S. Dep't of State , decided yesterday by Chief Judge James Boasberg (D.D.C.): Plaintiffs are 49 U.S. visa applicants. Their applications were suspended under a January 2026 State Department policy that indefinitely pauses visa issuances for nationals of 75 countries. The Department presents the policy as part of an ongoing review of visa-vetting procedures, asserting that nationals of the designated countries "are at a high risk for becoming a public charge," and are therefore inadmissible under 8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(4). Plaintiffs contend that this policy violates the Immigration and Nationality Act by authorizing categorical visa denials based solely on applicant nationality. They seek adjudication of their individual applications, as well as declarations that the policy is ultra vires and violates the Administrative Procedure Act, vacatur of the policy, and an injunction barring its enforcement…. The question at this point is whether plaintiffs can proceed pseudonymously, and the court says most can't: At this stage, one Plaintiff has succeeded in demonstrating that her privacy and safety interests outweigh the public's presumptive and substantial interest in learning her identity. The remaining Plaintiffs fall short. Jamaican Plaintiff Michelle Doe ("M. Doe") states that disclosure could enable her physically abusive ex-spouse to locate her and her children. Plaintiff Anastasiia Doe ("A. Doe"), a Russian national residing in Russia, alleges a risk of retaliation stemming from her documented U.S. ties. The remaining Plaintiffs, who hail from various countries, generally invoke emotional, reputational, employment, and pecuniary risks…. This Court has credited concrete safety threats as concerns that exceed "the annoyance and criticism that may attend litigation" and implicate "matter[s] of [a] sensitive and personal nature." Here, M. Doe alleges that her ex-spouse has a history of physical violence and "will use any information … to try to track [her] down." Her family thus does not publicly release "anything personal about [them]selves." … At this early stage, … the Court finds [M.Doe's] claims sufficient to establish that disclosure would pose a risk of harm. A. Doe presents a closer call. As a Russian national residing in Russia, she fears that disclosure could expose her to "adverse consequences," since "Russians with documented U.S. family ties are routinely targeted." Her claims are thinly supported. Still, this Court has recognized the sensitivity of disclosing information that could expose foreign nationals to retaliation in their home countries. Given her residence and alleged vulnerability in Russia, [this factor] slightly favors pseudonymity for A. Doe. The remaining Plaintiffs assert emotional, reputational, professional, pecuniary, and broad safety harms. Their contentions are generally attenuated and prospective. See, e.g., [Client Quest.] at 1 (asserting that disclosure would induce "emotional distress" or cause their family to be "targeted due to their race, ethnicity, and assumptions [by others]"); id. at 3 (maintaining risks of "unwanted scrutiny," "financial harassment," and "scams, extortion, or social/political suspicion" that attend U.S. immigration ties in Plaintiff's home country); id. at 8 (asserting risks of "harm, harassment, or retaliation," including "social scrutiny, jealousy, or targeting for financial exploitation" if Plaintiff were "identif[ied] as someone with active U.S. immigration involvement); id. at 9 (similar). Most are framed as harms that " could " be triggered by disclosure, rather than consequences established with any degree of certainty. Indeed, several Plaintiffs characterize their interests as "preventative" or expressly disclaim prior threats or harassment. While these risks are no doubt concerning for Plaintiffs, … "speculative and unsubstantiated claims of harm to [plaintiffs'] reputational or economic interests are insufficient to justify proceeding anonymously." Where this Court has found [a risk of harm] to support pseudonymity, plaintiffs have alleged particularized threats, specific instances of violence, or documented retaliation. See, e.g. , Molina v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. (D.D.C. 2025) (crediting fears of "physical harm and harassment" where plaintiffs had previously been arrested and had invoked "high-profile immigration cases where other litigants … faced similar abuse"); Doe v. Blinken (D.D.C. 2023) (citing news coverage of Taliban murdering "Afghan nationals like [p]laintiff" and threats that plaintiff " already received "); Islamic Republic of Iran (D.D.C. 2023) (detailing "severe violence and threats … [plaintiffs] … already faced," such as being 'taken hostage' and 'subjected to various forms of torture'"). Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs assert predictive concerns with thin evidence. Plaintiffs' employment-related allegations fail for the same reason. See Client Quest. at 2 ("Public identification would expose my spouse's … employment …."); id. at 5 ("[Disclosure] could negatively affect my family's employment …."); id. at 9 ("[Disclosure] could lead to misunderstanding, judgment, or reputational harm among colleagues [and] future employers …."). Alleged employment ramifications may support pseudonymity when buttressed by sufficient evidence. Doe v. Lieberman (D.D.C. 2020). But conclusory assertions do not suffice. Contrast Bird v. Barr (D.D.C. 2019) (giving weight to plaintiffs' declarations detailing how disclosure could jeopardize their careers), and Doe v. Benoit (D.D.C. 2019) (finding pseudonymity "justified" where plaintiff adduced "sufficient detail" regarding potential professional harms), with Thomas v. Power , (D.D.C. 2023) (finding [the risk of harm] factor unsatisfied where plaintiff "neither describe[d] nor substantiate[d] how disclosing her identity would in fact harm her professional prospects or reputation")…. Turning to mental harm, many Plaintiffs allege potential emotional consequences, stress, or anxiety that would result from proceeding under their true names. But these claims lack detail and evidence. This Court has previously found mental harm sufficient to support pseudonymity where plaintiffs demonstrated concrete psychological effects directly linked to disclosure. See, e.g. , Emp. #1 v. Dep't of Behav. Health (D.D.C. 2023) ("Plaintiff explains that he has already faced 'cyber-bullying,' " and its attendant mental harm because defendants had "publish[ed] a report" tying plaintiff to crime); Doe v. Cabrera (D.D.C. 2014) ("Were the Court to force the plaintiff to reveal her identity, [it] would risk undermining the psychological treatment [she] has already undergone" following alleged harm by defendant). Plaintiffs offer no such evidence here. See, e.g. , Client Quest. at 4 ("[Disclosure] would … create anxiety and emotional distress for my family."). The [mental harm] factor thus fails for all but M. Doe…. [Moreover,] "[t]here is a heightened public interest when an individual or entity files a suit against the government[,]" particularly in a manner that may "alter the operation of public law both as applied to it and, by virtue of the legal arguments presented, to other parties going forward." Although Plaintiffs "seek consular adjudication of their individual visa applications," they also pursue programmatic relief. They specifically request declarations "that the State Department's policy … exceeds the authority granted by the INA … [and] violate[s] the APA"; vacatur of the policy; a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the policy; and "a declaratory judgment stating that the immigrant visa pause is unauthorized and contrary to the Constitution and laws of the United States." This case therefore implicates a "heightened public interest" …. [This analysis] support[s] pseudonymity for M. Doe, and the Court finds that the concrete nature of the risk she faces from disclosure counsels in favor of permitting her to proceed pseudonymously. The other Plaintiffs stand on less firm ground …. Although A. Doe has made out a possible threat of retaliation in Russia, it does not outweigh the heightened public interest implicated here…. Different courts may handle some of these factors differently: Some courts, for instance, categorically reject concerns about harm to employment prospects, because they view them as nearly ubiquitous in many classes of cases. Some courts view the fact that a lawsuit is brought against the government as counseling in favor of pseudonymity, rather than (as in this case) against. But this still struck me as a noteworthy decision, especially since in the D.C. federal court the rules call for the Chief Judge to initially deal with pseudonymity requests; the Chief Judge's view on the matter is thus likely to affect the great bulk of filings in the D.C. federal court. (In other district courts, individual judges decide pseudonymity motions, so one judge's decision will only be potentially persuasive precedent for others.) The post No Pseudonymity for Most Challengers of Visa Vetting Policy appeared first on Reason.com .

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