Why Pakistan will likely refuse to join the Abraham Accords

“Why Pakistan will likely refuse to join the Abraham Accords Submitted by Zia Ur Rehman on Fri, 05/29/2026 - 18:31 Despite Trump's pressure, costs of normalising ties with Israel are higher in Pakistan than in Arab states due to its more vibrant and contested political landscape US Secretary of State Marco Rubio meets with Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar in the Treaty Room of the State Department in Washington, DC, on 29 May 2026 (Mandel Ngan/AFP) Off For decades, Pakistani passports have carried a simple but striking inscription: “Valid for all countries of the world except Israel ." This position is more than a diplomatic formality. It reflects one of Pakistan’s longest-standing foreign policy principles: Pakistan does not recognise Israel. Rooted in Pakistan's founding in 1947, this policy is reinforced by deep religious sentiment, a sensitive media ecosystem, successive governments' reluctance to challenge either, and a national consensus that views the Israeli- Palestinian conflict as a historical injustice. Now, this long-standing consensus is facing an unprecedented external test. US President Donald Trump has linked a proposed peace deal to end the war with Iran to a dramatic, “mandatory” expansion of the Abraham Accords. The accords were a series of bilateral normalisation agreements between Israel and several Muslim-majority nations, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, originally brokered by the US during the first Trump administration in 2020. Morocco and Sudan later joined the framework. In a lengthy post on Truth Social , following discussions with regional leaders, including Pakistan's army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Trump demanded that Pakistan, Saudi Arabia , Qatar , Turkey , and others join the accords “simultaneously” to solidify a historic regional settlement. “It should start with the immediate signing by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and everybody else should follow suit,” Trump wrote. Islamabad swiftly rejected the notion. Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif on 26 May said that Pakistan could not become part of any arrangement that conflicted with its “fundamental ideologies”. “Right now, no initiative in this regard has been taken by us, nor has anyone asked us,” Asif told a Pakistani TV channel. The episode has reignited a debate that surfaces periodically in Pakistan but rarely gains political traction: could Islamabad ever recognise Israel, and under what circumstances? Why Pakistan says 'no' Pakistan's position on Israel has remained largely unchanged since the country's founding. Successive civilian and military governments have maintained that recognition of Israel is contingent upon the establishment of an independent Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital. While governments have differed on many aspects of foreign policy, there has been remarkable continuity on this issue. '[Costs are] significantly higher in Pakistan than in most Arab states' - Pakistani foreign ministry official In January, Pakistan’s Foreign Office spokesperson, Tahir Andrabi, reiterated Islamabad’s position that it would not join the Abraham Accords while responding to questions about President Trump’s proposed “Board of Peace,” which was intended to oversee post-war Gaza. “We have no issue with which countries choose to join or not join the accords,” Andrabi said. “We view the matter through the prism of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state.” Analysts say the policy is shaped not only by diplomatic considerations but also by powerful domestic political realities. “Unlike the Gulf monarchies that joined the Abraham Accords, Pakistan operates in a highly contested political environment where public opinion, Islamist parties, jihadi groups, parliament, civil society, and a vibrant media all exert influence over foreign policy debates,” Muhammad Israr Madani, head of the International Research Council for Religious Affairs, an Islamabad-based think-tank, told the Middle East Eye. A senior Pakistani foreign ministry official said the political costs of normalisation are “significantly higher in Pakistan than in most Arab states”. “Any government perceived as abandoning the Palestinian cause would face immediate resistance from religious parties and significant sections of the public," the official said. The issue is further complicated by Pakistan's position on Kashmir. For decades, Pakistani policymakers have drawn parallels between the Palestinian and Kashmiri struggles, framing both as issues of self-determination and international law. Many analysts argue that recognising Israel without a Palestinian settlement would expose Islamabad to accusations of inconsistency and weaken one of the central pillars of its diplomatic narrative. Pressure from Washington Trump’s latest proposal goes further by linking future regional diplomacy, including a potential understanding with Iran , to an expanded normalisation framework. The proposal has been met with scepticism across much of the Muslim world, particularly amid continuing anger over Israel's genocide in Gaza. Why Trump is using Iran talks to revive the Abraham Accords Read More » The Abraham Accords have been a central pillar of his Middle East strategy since his first tenure. Among the strongest advocates of the initiative is Senator Lindsey Graham, one of Trump's closest allies in Congress. Graham has publicly argued that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Pakistan should support the accords, describing their expansion as “beyond transformative for the region and the world”. “If you refuse to go down this path as suggested by President Trump, it will have severe repercussions for our future relationships and make this peace proposal unacceptable,” Graham warned in a post on X on 24 May. “Further, it would be seen by history as a major miscalculation.” The debate comes at a sensitive moment in US-Pakistan relations. Islamabad has sought to position itself as a diplomatic bridge between Washington and Tehran, while simultaneously maintaining close ties with Saudi Arabia and China. Some American lawmakers, such as Senator Graham, and commentators have questioned whether Pakistan can play the role of neutral mediator while remaining firmly opposed to Israel. For Pakistani policymakers, however, joining the Abraham Accords would create new risks. 'The Abraham Accords cannot be sustained through coercion or transactional pressure' - Asif Durrani, Pakistan's former ambassador to Iran and UAE Recognition of Israel could complicate relations with Iran, trigger domestic unrest, and undermine Islamabad's carefully balanced regional diplomacy. “The Abraham Accords cannot be sustained through coercion or transactional pressure,” said Asif Durrani, Pakistan’s former ambassador to Iran and the UAE . According to Durrani, lasting regional peace requires “credible diplomacy, mutual security guarantees, de-escalation with Iran, and meaningful progress on Palestine” rather than pressure tactics or attempts to shift responsibility onto regional partners. Veteran Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir also suggested on X that President Trump’s recent remarks show his anger over Pakistan and Saudi Arabia's refusal to join the Abraham Accords. Some analysts, however, caution against assuming that warmer ties with the Trump administration would translate into a shift in Pakistan’s policy towards Israel. They note that Islamabad has historically maintained independent positions on key strategic issues, including China, Afghanistan, and regional security, even in the face of pressure from Washington. “President Trump is aware of those limitations,” said one Islamabad-based security official. “That may explain why he acknowledged that one or two countries could ultimately decide not to join the Abraham Accords. Pakistan is widely viewed as one of the most likely candidates.” The Saudi variable While Pakistan insists that its foreign policy decisions are sovereign, analysts widely agree that any future shift on Israel would be closely linked to Saudi Arabia’s position. As the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites and one of Pakistan’s most important strategic partners, Riyadh’s actions carry significant political and religious weight in Islamabad. Abraham Accords: Support for normalisation deals with Israel plummets in Gulf countries Read More » The relationship extends far beyond diplomacy. Saudi Arabia has long provided Pakistan with financial support, investment, employment opportunities for millions of Pakistani workers, and extensive defence cooperation. The two countries further strengthened their ties with a security agreement signed in September , which states that an attack on either country would be considered an attack on both. Although the practical implications of such a commitment remain open to interpretation, the pact highlights the depth of their strategic partnership. Against this backdrop, many observers believe that Saudi Arabia’s approach to Israel will heavily influence any debate within Pakistan over possible normalisation. Michael Kugelman, senior fellow for South Asia at The Atlantic Council, recently suggested that Pakistan “would feel pressure to reconsider” its position if Riyadh were to join the Abraham Accords. “But given where public sentiment stands, a Pakistani govt that joins them would risk committing political suicide,” he warned in a post on X . Even then, Saudi Arabia continues to insist that normalisation must be tied to a credible pathway towards a two-state solution, a position that largely mirrors Pakistan’s own stance. The Gaza factor If normalisation was politically difficult before October 2023, the war in Gaza has made it considerably harder. Before the conflict, the US was actively courting Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords, with many analysts viewing a Saudi-Israeli breakthrough as increasingly likely. Such a move would have placed significant pressure on Pakistan to reassess its own position towards Israel, given Riyadh’s political and religious influence in the Muslim world. That prospect, however, was dramatically altered by the Hamas-led attack on southern Israel on 7 October 2023 and Israel’s subsequent military campaign in Gaza. The war effectively froze Saudi-Israeli normalisation talks. As civilian casualties mounted and images of widespread destruction in Gaza dominated regional media coverage, support for engagement with Israel declined sharply across much of the Muslim world. In Pakistan, the conflict further hardened public attitudes. According to a 2023 Gallup Pakistan survey , 91 percent of Pakistanis said they sympathised with Palestinians in Gaza, while only two percent expressed sympathy for Israel. Religious groups, mainstream political parties, and civil society organisations have portrayed the war as evidence that normalisation without a viable Palestinian state would be both morally and politically untenable. For now, Pakistan appears unlikely to alter its position. Trump’s latest call for an expanded Abraham Accords framework is not the first time Islamabad has faced questions about recognising Israel. Despite shifting regional dynamics and periodic speculation about a policy change, Pakistan’s seven-decade-old red line remains firmly in place. Inside Pakistan Islamabad News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0

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