Trapped between Europe and the US

“Keir Starmer has signalled a willingness to engage closer with Europe. But despite the rift that the war in Iran has created between the two countries, the UK still relies on and needs to sustain its relationship with the US. While that’s the case, argues Luke Stephens , the UK will stay trapped between Europe and the US, peripheral in importance to both. Enjoying this post? Then sign up to our newsletter and receive a weekly roundup of all our articles. Speaking from Downing Street on 1 April 2026, the Prime Minister told the British public that “our long-term national interest requires closer partnership with our allies in Europe and with the European Union”. This statement further signaled that the Government’s direction of travel is towards greater cooperation with Europe, highlighting a more cordial relationship away from the heightened tensions which marked the years after Brexit. However, this shift towards Europe has remained in the shadow of Britain’s security relationship with the United States under President Trump. While this balance between Europe and the US has long been at the centre of Britain’s foreign policy strategy, it is increasingly hard to sustain as Britain is caught between its ambitions and the relationships needed to pursue them. From Global Britain to European reset In the aftermath of Brexit and the “ Global Britain ” agenda first articulated under Theresa May and Boris Johnson, Britain’s commitment to European security was often fraught. Central to “Global Britain” was reinforcing Britain’s global presence by looking beyond Europe rather than through it. Yet following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Britain began a reorientation towards European security cooperation. Under Rishi Sunak, the Integrated Review Refresh reprioritised European security as Britain’s central strategic focus, and alongside the Windsor Framework , opened the way for a more positive political relationship with Brussels. This trajectory continued following the July 2024 election of Labour under Sir Keir Starmer. While Starmer was clear that Britain would not seek to re-join the EU, closer relations with Europe became central to its international focus, formalised at the first UK–EU summit in May 2025 with a new Security and Defence Partnership. Importantly, while Labour has continued to speak of global ambitions – Starmer declared at the summit that “ Britain is back on the world stage ” – unlike the Conservative-era Global Britain agenda which defined that role through independence from Europe, such claims are now defined through closer relations with European partners. While Starmer has spoken of the need for Europe to take primary responsibility for its own defence, he has also continued to reinforce the importance of the relationship with the United States. Of course, Britain’s relationship with European security continues to be shaped primarily through NATO rather than independent European structures. Yet Labour has clearly prioritised the security focus on Europe more strongly than in the years following Brexit, with the 2025 Strategic Defence Review placing a “ NATO First ” as the priority of its defence ambitions. In Munich, Starmer reinforced this trajectory calling for a “European NATO” underpinned by deeper UK–EU links across defence, industry, and the wider economy, and declaring that ‘we are not the Britain of the Brexit years anymore’. Trying to maintain the special relationship Despite this broader shift, Britain’s renewed focus on Europe has been shaped byTrump’s re-election. Trump has continued his criticism of NATO allies over under-investment in their own defence, and his administration’s growing reluctance to sustain support for Ukraine has reinforced European calls for greater strategic autonomy. Yet while Starmer has spoken of the need for Europe to take primary responsibility for its own defence, he has also continued to reinforce the importance of the relationship with the United States, dismissing claims that Europe can deliver its security needs outside of US capabilities. Labour has actively sought to maintain the “ special relationship ” under Trump, with Starmer celebrating UK-US ties as “the deepest, most advanced defence relationship in the world”. His silence over Trump’s threats about annexing Canada and reluctance to respond to trade tariffs on UK exports reflect a government walking a careful line, and the desire to remain close to both Washington and Brussels, and to be seen as indispensable to each. However, maintaining this balance has become increasingly difficult, with a rupture in the international order further challenging Britain’s attempts at maintaining a prominent security role within it. The Trump administration’s suggestions that the United States must take control of Greenland has seen Britain align firmly with the European position, emphasising Danish sovereignty. More significant are the growing tensions following the launch of a US–Israeli military campaign against Iran. Britain’s refusal to allow the United States to use British bases for offensive operations marked a clear and public divergence from Washington, with the UK also unwilling to join the military campaign. Starmer’s defence of this position on legal and strategic grounds has seen Trump question the state of the “special relationship” and suggest Starmer is “no Churchill”. While the conflict is still ongoing, Britain’s reluctance to get involved places the UK alongside the majority of its NATO allies in opposition to the campaign, but at real cost to its relationship with Washington. Independent or isolated? These tensions illustrate the broader dilemma facing Britain. The Starmer government has sought to rebuild relations with Europe while preserving the central role of the United States within its security strategy. Yet faced with challenges in either direction, sustaining that balance is becoming increasingly difficult. There remains a clear desire for a strong transatlantic relationship in shaping the demands of British foreign policy. Starmer’s decision not to join the US and Israel over Iran has been met with criticism in much of the conservative press, while both Reform leader Nigel Farage and Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch argued that Britain should have supported the US more directly. Rather than acting as a bridge between Europe and the US, Britain risks becoming a peripheral figure in both. The domestic politics around Brexit similarly remain a factor. While public opinion suggests a desire for closer relations with Europe, the political divisions created by Brexit remain significant. Reform UK has promised to overturn agreements negotiated by Labour and the Conservatives, while Badenoch has warned against what she describes as a “ Brexit betrayal ” in closer relations with the EU. Aside from domestic opposition, closer ties to Europe remain structurally challenging. The collapse of initial talks in late 2025 over British access to the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) defence fund, a €150 billion instrument designed to strengthen European defence industrial capacity, after disagreements over the UK’s expected financial contribution highlight this. Britain’s desire for meaningful participation in emerging European defence initiatives remains restricted by its independence from the European bloc. Peripheral to both Europe and the US? At the heart of these dynamics lies a narrowing set of options for British foreign policy. Britain’s reset with the EU – first under Sunak and now under Starmer – represents a clear and genuine shift away from the tensions of the Brexit years, and Britain has made clear its desire to take a prominent position within an enhanced European security framework. That it has done so while seeking to maintain closer ties with the US speaks to the broader post-imperial disposition which has long shaped British foreign policy. But despite initial optimism that Britain was succeeding in maintaining this balance, the reality is that it faces being increasingly isolated from the centres of power in both. Efforts to keep the US involved in supporting Ukraine face further challenges as Washington shifts focus to the war with Iran, and while the conflict has been at the forefront of Britain’s promotion of a “European NATO”, those efforts continue to face tensions and obstacles. Rather than acting as a bridge between Europe and the US, Britain risks becoming a peripheral figure in both. The result is a Britain that has moved to work closer with Europe on security following Brexit, while remaining too wedded to the idea of the transatlantic relationship to complete that transition. Enjoyed this post? Sign up to our newsletter and receive a weekly roundup of all our articles. All articles posted on this blog give the views of the author(s), and not the position of LSE British Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics and Political Science. Image credit: OnePixelStudio on Shutterstock The post Trapped between Europe and the US first appeared on LSE British Politics .

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